et si... la navette spatiale avait été annulée (en 1971) ?

Comme le titre l'indique. C'est mon "master" projet, déjà 8 ans que j'ai commencé, j'en ai 1500 pages (!!) et ce n'est pas fini. Je me suis enfin décidé a le poser sur AH.com.
http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=366697

OTL la navette a été approuvé par Nixon le 5 Janvier 1972 et à volé en 1981, presque dix ans après. Ici tout est différent: pas de navette américaine donc pas de Bourane et pas davantage de Hermès.

pour faire bref, la NASA va construire une station spatiale très différente de l'ISS et ça dès les années 70. J'ai même trouvé quelqu'un de doué pour faire ma station spatiale en CGI

ça a l'air intéressant, tu en est a quel année (pas sur AH mais dans ton travail)?

J'en suis a peu près a notre époque, 2015, soit plus de 40 ans après la divergence.

Je suis en train de revisiter ce truc là. J'ai plusieurs problèmes: c'est trop dense, trop technique, ça part un peu dans tout les sens... je suis en train de le retailler façon bonzaï pour le rendre un peu plus digeste.

Fait toi plaisir et post nous ça.

Deja je vais poster un résumé, enfin tenter.

La navette spatiale crève un jour d'octobre 1971, tuée par les conseillers de Nixon (ah, Nixon... Futuruma, AH.com, les simpsons... personnage culte de la pop américaine).

1971 ? 10 ans avant le premier vol de Columbia ? mais oui.
La chose était en route depuis 1968 (!) et OTL Nixon finança le projet le 5 Janvier 1972. alors Octobre 1971, ce n'est pas trop tard...

Bref voilà la navette morte et enterrée. Au passage, 14 astronautes sauveront leur peau, en 1986 et en 2003... passons là dessus.

Mais alors, quoi pour la remplacer ?

Un "package" plus équilibré, constitué de

- 1 Big Gemini: une capsule Gemini très améliorée, rallongée, aussi grande qu'un cockpit de navette spatiale donc capable d'embarquer 8 astronautes
- 2 pour la lancer: la Titan III des militaires
- 3 Apollo survit, mais comme "chaloupe de sauvetage" si jamais la station spatiale explose ou prends feu
- 4 une station spatiale: un croisement de Mir et de Skylab. De Mir, elle à l'architecture (en forme d'helice). de Skylab, elle reprends la transformation d'étage de Saturn V en station (dry workshop, pas wet workshop)
Imaginez cinq Skylab attachées ensemble, avec un module encore plus gros dérivé de l'étage S-II. 22 ft de diamètre et 33 ft de diamètre. Bref un volume interne colossal.
- 5 Pour lancer cette station, on recycle toute les Saturn IB et V abandonnées par Apollo. Il y en a 9 en stockage: 2 Saturn V et 7 Saturn IB.

- 6 et enfin, faute de navette pour assembler tout ça, on reprends (encore) Mir: les modules sont emmenés par un remorqueur automatique largué ensuite. Ici c'est le Lockheed Agena qui est choisi, un étage prolifique et bon marché (365 construits OTL, ici ont va doubler ou tripler ce nombre: une 2CV de l'espace ce truc).

Avec ça la NASA se retrouve avec un programme spatial proche de celui... des russes, avec Salyut - Soyuz - Mir. Un truc pas cher et incassable, contrairement à la navette OTL.

après le fun c'est d'imaginer toute les ramifications que ce programme spatial alternatif va avoir - sur les russes, l'europe, les militaires américains, les successeurs de la navette (plus réussis) et un peu partout ailleurs...

et c'est bien ça mon problème: ça part dans tout les sens !

Un exemple de divergence amusante... Oleg Baklanov.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleg_Baklanov

ce type, avant d'être un des 8 comploteurs d'aout 1991 contre Gorbatchev, était en charge des missiles et fusées soviétiques, notamment Energiya et la station laser Polyus.

Si la navette américaine est annulée, Bourane va crever aussi, et Energiya avec elle. Par ricochet, il va falloir trouver un nouveau lanceur pour Polyus en 1985-87... et ça va impacter Baklanov, qui basiquement avait utilisé Polyus pour faire passer Gorbatchev pour un menteur aux yeux de Reagan. En effet Gorbatchev effaré par le SDI et incapable d'y répondre, avait adopté la stratégie suivante "le SDI, nous n'avons pas d'équivalent en étude."
Ben si, Polyus, c'était exactement ça ! Une amorce de SDI soviétique !
Sauf que Baklanov et les militaires avait obtenu le feu vert en 1985 en noyant le poisson auprès d'un Gorbatchev qui venait tout juste d'arriver au pouvoir et n'était pas vraiment au courant. ça et le sommet de Reykjavik en octobre 1986 (eh Ronald, et si on balançait toute les armes nucléaires à la poubelle ? Yuri, quelle bonne idée ! - sic)

Lors du sommet de Reykjavik OTL, Reagan et gorbatchev on discuté tranquilou, au coin du feu et un dimanche après-midi, de l'élimination possible des armes nucléaires, ou au moins des ICBMs. Véridique. Mais Gorbatchev s'est ensuite crispé sur l'obstination de Reagan a vouloir poursuivre son foutu SDI et tout a raté. Gorbachev n'a découvert Polyus qu'en mai 1987 lors du premier lancement d'Energiya dont c'était la charge utile. Et il a dit "ah ben ça alors ! si j'avais su que ce truc - un SDI soviétique ! existait avant d'aller a Reykjavik !"
Et ben ITTL, c'est ce que je fait.
En fait en 1974 Mir est remplacé par une station appelée MKBS qui elle, a des applications militaires. Liée a un éventuel SDI soviétique. Cette MKBS est lancée dès 1982...et Baklanov est obligée de la lier, de près ou de loin, avec Polyus. contrairement à OTL ou Mir, Buran, Energiya, masquaient le projet. Du coup la MKBS attire l'atention des scientifiques pacifistes comme Sagdeev et Velikhov, conseillers de Gorbatchev contre les mitaires et conservateurs - Baklanov ! Aussi, ITTL Polyus  est lancé par la N-1, le booster lunaire rescapé.

Tout ça fait que Gorbachev est au courant de Polyus AVANT Reykjavik... et ça change tout !

Allez, un petit extrait de ma prose... en anglais


***

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972

Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972

Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972

Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972

Entered into force October 3, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,
Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarma-ment, and general and complete disarmament,
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,
Have agreed as follows:
[SNIP]

Article V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

"The Reagan administration is currently attempting to reinterpret the Antiballistic Missile Treaty to allow more leeway for its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This reinterpretation poses a comparaable issue of policy versus the law. Signed and ratified in 1972, the ABM Treaty bans the development and testing, as well as deployment, of space-based and other mobile ABM systems or essential components. The administration, citing the treaty itself and the record of its negotiation, has claimed that the ban does not apply to systems based on new technologies. Under the new interpretation, Article V is read as permitting development and testing of space-based lasers and particle beams, despite the unambiguous language forbidding development, testing and deployment of all mobile ABM 'systems.
The Administration argues that Treaty language banning anything more than research on mobile ABM systems applies only to "traditional" systems, that is, rockets guided by radars. The administration argues that futuristic weapons like lasers and particle beam would not be concerned basically because they didn't existed in 1972.  They further argue that the Soviets never agreed to a strict interpretation on this point. It considers development and testing of SDI-type ABM systems to be permitted by the Treaty. By contrast deployment would required rewritting the treaty.
Weinberger, Perle, et. al., essentially seek to remove a legal barrier to the SDI program through reinterpretation. If SDI in some form proves feasible and desirable, then continued compliance with the traditional Treaty interpretation would not be in the national interest. However, negotiations to modify the Treaty or abrogation by the US would be the straightforward remedy to that problem. The Administration's unilateral revision is a way of avoiding the issue, and not coincidentally of avoiding drawing attention to the arms control implications of pressing ahead with SDI.
In Geneva Soviet leader Gorbachev made clear he would not agree to that (shameful) reinterpretation. Since then that argument has become a mainstay of Soviet rethoric against SDI – that it violates the ABM treaty. The Reagan administration however stubbornely clings to its reinterpretation vision, leading to a deadlock."

Unbestknown to the West, Gorbachev science advisors Velikhov and Sagdeev opinion was that the reinterpretation debate was sterile, since lasers and particle beam weapons remained unworkable, even in space.

***

"I think I know every square foot of Iceland. Although I haven't been there yet, I'm just having finished Red Storm Rising by the author of Red October. If you haven't read it it's worth the effort."

(excerpt from a letter by Ronald Reagan to a friend, dated October 6, 1986)

***

These mist covered mountains
Are a home now for me
But my home is the lowlands
And always will be

(Dire Straits, Brother in arms)

***

October 12 1986
Reykjavik, Iceland
Hofdi house

It was definitively not an ordinary disarmement summit, and a far cry from the Geneva talks a year before. The meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan had been hastily set up, only a month before. Hofdi House was quite an isolated place by itself, and the importance of that summit had been downplayed. That afternoon had not even been on the intial planning: it was a last ditch atempt, a hastily improvised talk before each man flew to their respective countries.
The conditions were in fact ideal for a frank talk between two men that were no longer, for a brief moment, the most powerful in the world. Their respective hardliners half a planet away, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev could now speak more easily.

...

"On January 15, 1986, Gorbachev stunned the world by proposing that all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe be eliminated and that all nuclear weapons be retired by 2000. Although the West did not took the message seriously, the fact was that Gorbachev official commitment to a nuclear-free world had inevitably required approval of the Politburo. On can wonder how did Gorbachev manage to secure the acquiescence of Soviet hawks ?
It's an intriguing story.
In the spring of 1985, Soviet military officials were worried that Gorbachev and his advisers were getting ready to offer serious concessions to the U.S. government in negotiations over the removal of intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe. To head off such concessions, they suggested what they considered would a good combination of useful propaganda and a non-negotiable proposal: nothing less than a nuclear-free world! Nikolai Detinov, an official in the Soviet Ministry of Defense who drafted the nuclear abolition proposal, recalled: "They could show, on the one hand, that the Soviet Union and its general secretary were eager to eliminate nuclear weapons and, on the other ... that they understood that such a declaration hardly could lead to any practical results ... or affect ... the ongoing negotiations." But Gorbachev outsmarted them, for he used the military's backing of nuclear abolition to legitimize the proposal and, then, to make it official government policy.
Thus, Detinov recalled, "the real authors of this idea became entrapped by their own gambit.”
After Brezhnev’s death there remained a powerful group of proponents of arms control and reductions in Soviet political leadership and bureaucracies; this group included Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, his first deputy Georgy M. Kornienko, head of the General Staff Sergei F. Akhromeyev, and a group of professional arms control negotiators (peregovorshchiki). The dominant force behind this group was the General Staff and those diplomats - Gromyko, Akhromeyev, Kornienko - who shared concerns of the military establishment.
The history of the Soviet nuclear abolition program dates back to the spring of 1985, according to first-hand accounts by the top officials who developed the proposal. Soon after Gorbachev came to power in March of that year, Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev first spoke to Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kornienko and the head of the Legal and Treaty Department of the General Staff, General Nikolai Chervov, about preparing a detailed program of total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Kornienko supported the idea, and Akhromeyev gave orders to selected military experts to study the issues and prepare a draft. Very few people knew about the program until the end of 1985. Soviet arms control expert General Viktor Starodubov mentions that the planners felt the time was right to present it to Gorbachev after his meeting with Reagan in GenevaAccording to Gorbachev’s spokesman and biographer, Andrey Grachev, the drafters of the program envisioned it in terms somewhat similar to those of the U.S. drafters of Reagan’s “zero option” INF solution of 1981. They thought that the chances of the U.S. side accepting abolition were close to zero, but that making the proposal would provide both strong negotiating grounds and propaganda points to their own side.
According to General Starodubov, quoted in Grachev, Akhromeyev’s reasoning was that “if by any chance the Americans accepted the idea, the Soviet side would be able to make full use of its advantage in conventional weapons.” Akromeyev was certainly no angel.
Gorbachev, however, saw the program differently—as an opportunity to advance the U.S.-Soviet arms control discussion that had stalled after Geneva with a bold, radical stroke—which he thought would be acceptable to Reagan because of his strongly expressed belief in a nuclear-free world. Also, by accepting the Akhromeyev-Kornienko drafted initiative, Gorbachev, according to Grachev, “trapped” his own military into supporting very deep cuts in armaments across the board.
After the Geneva summit in November 1985, a strong political momentum emerged for new initiatives, since Gorbachev was to deliver a policy address to the 26th Party Congress in February 1986. On New Year’s Eve, he met in Moscow with all Soviet arms negotiators. He asked for fresh ideas and approaches, and they, frustrated with years of fruitless talks with the West, eagerly shared them with him. Then he demanded that they should repeat them in front of the entire Politburo.
At the same time Kornienko and Akhromeyev plotted, apart from the rest of the arms control community, to present Gorbachev with an attractive "comprehensive" plan of complete nuclear disarmament by 2000. In the end, they carried the day and persuaded Gorbachev (who then left for vacation in Pitsunda on the Black Sea) to approve of their idea. Returning from vacation, he announced the plan to the world and inserted it into the foreign policy section of his political report to the 27th Congress of the CPSU. The Soviet leader began to speak about the need for "new thinking" and, as seen in retrospect, made the total abolition of nuclear weapons a pillar of this thinking.

***

"The Geneva summit followed by Gorbachev official commitment to a nuclear-free world divided Reagan advisers. Shultz agreed with Reagan's impulses and was pleased that the "Soviets were now talking from our script."
But Secretary of Defense Weinberger and his influential assistant secretary for national security policy, Richard Perle, were wary of any attempt to reach agreement. Would the Soviets really change? They doubted it. Were Gorbachev's reforms significant? Intelligence analysts did not think so. And if, in fact, Gorbachev succeeded at reform, might he make the Soviet Union into a stronger adversary? They worried that the president might be lured into a foolish deal. Reagan hated nuclear weapons and believed that once the world was rid of them, Star Wars might shield America against rogue states cheating on an agreement.
Skeptical of his idiosyncratic view yet knowing they had to support him, Weinberger and Perle proposed that, in Reykjavik Reagan should offer Gorbachev a deal that would eliminate all ballistic missiles. This plan actually sounded transformative, but Weinberger and Perle knew the Soviets would reject it because it would mean the elimination of a category of weaponry in which they were superior. By doing so, Reagan could capture the high ground yet kill the negotiating process-precisely what Weinberger and Perle hoped to accomplish.
(...)
An interesting question is how on Earth could Weinberger - a notable hawk -  suggests, or even agree, on the idea of scraping all ballistic missiles ?
It's another interesting story.
The originator of Zero Ballistic Missiles as a U.S. negotiating proposal was Fred Ikle, the Swiss-born defense intellectual and former professor who had been director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Nixon and Ford administrations and who during most of the Reagan administration was under secretary of defense for policy, the number-three official at the Pentagon.
Ikle had long considered the incredible speed of intercontinental missiles — and the resulting threat of surprise attack — the most dangerous attribute of the Cold War. Shortly before joining the Nixon administration in 1973, Ikle suggested in the scholarly journal Foreign Affairs that the United States and the Soviet Union "could jointly decide to replace the doomsday catapults invented in the 1950s with arms that are incapable of being launched swiftly. If the strategic order could be transformed in this way, the dominant fear of surprise attack which drives our arms competition would loosen its grip."
The distinction between dangerous "fast-flying" ballistic missiles that threatened a nuclear surprise attack (and in which the Soviets had a numerical advantage) and less dangerous "slow-flying" bombers and cruise missiles (in which the United States had an advantage) was a central tenet of Reagan administration arms control. The idea was to get rid of the "fast-flyers" to the greatest degree possible.
In late December of 1985, Ikle met over lunch in the Executive Office Building in the White House compound with Donald Fortier, who recently had become deputy national security adviser when Poindexter moved up from the deputy's job to replace Robert McFarlane. Fortier was interested in new ideas, especially for the next U.S. -Soviet summit. Among those Ikle suggested was a "zero missiles initiative." According to Ikle's notes of the lunch, he said this could be a historic proposition on the order of the 1946 "Baruch plan" under which the United States proposed to place control of atomic energy in the United Nations (but which was blocked by the Soviet Union).
Ikle expected that the idea of eliminating ballistic missiles would be attacked as impractical, but he told Fortier it was "not more infeasible" than the 50 percent reduction in strategic arms that had been endorsed at the Geneva summit. The discussion with Fortier (who unfortunately was dying of cancer) led nowhere, but in the spring, the idea came up again this time in a luncheon conversation of Ikle and Max Kampelman, who was the chief U.S. arms negotiator at the Geneva talks.
Kampelman, a pro-defense Democrat who had once been a staff aide to Senator Hubert Humphrey, knew how to get things done in Washington. The two officials, who had known each other for many years, were searching for a U.S. proposal dramatic enough to compete with Gorbachev's January 15 plan for a nuclear-weapons- free world.
When Ikle introduced the Zero Ballistic Missiles concept into the discussion, Kampelman enthusiastically agreed it was an important idea. He urged Ikle to discuss it with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who often had a notion of military feasibility different from those of Weinberger and the political echelon at Defense.
In another luncheon a few weeks later, Ikle told Kampelman he had informally broached the idea to the chiefs and that he had also taken it to Richard Perle, the conservative activist on arms negotiations issues who was nominally Ikle's subordinate at the Pentagon. After initial reluctance, Perle liked the proposal for his own reasons, including the belief that an offer to eliminate ballistic missiles would put the Soviets on the defensive. As Perle saw it, a U.S. offer to give up its means for offensive missile operations would destroy the theoretical basis for Soviet objections to SDI.
At their second meeting, Ikle said he planned to take his Zero Ballistic Missiles idea next to Weinberger, and Kampelman agreed to discuss it with Shultz. Ikle and Kampelman then followed through with their respective cabinet heavyweights with positive results all around. Weinberger himself formally endorsed the proposal on June 12; it was forwarded to Gorbachev himself on July 25.
Unofrtunately between these two dates the proposal was much watered down by Linhard and Pointdexter, which felt it went too far and come at the wrong time. For the aforementionned reasons hawkish Perle and Weinberger were secretely happy with that watering down; and indeed, when Gorbachev answered to the July 25 proposal on September 15, he treated is as step backward.
At this point Ikle hopes seemed to have been dashed and burned. And obviously the Daniloff affair that broke out late August  did not helped easing the relation between the two superpowers. Despite that setback the meeting initiative aparently popped into Gorbachev head  somewhere in the month of August - and an invitation was integrated into the 15 September letter.
The meeting itself was announced by Reagan on September 30 only - it was prepared in barely three weeks, an absurd little amount of time for such an important summit.

That Sunday afternoon in Iceland, having outsmarted their respective hardliners, Reagan and Gorbachev started to speak freely. Nothing could have prepared George Shultz to what followed, though. It was Gorbachev that started a memorable bargaining.

"The Soviet Union is ready to accept a cut of 50 percent of strategic weapons - leaving aside the British and French nuclear deterrents. Let's agree on START treaty; let's agree on the INF. We are ready to make concessions on all these points."

It took Reagan by surprise. A five years old deadlock had been zeroed in thirty seconds. What the hell... ? Ok, time to play that Iklé card.

"Then, why not cut all ballistic missiles to zero ? no more nuclear tipped rockets. Just cruise missiles and bombers. Yes, let's get ride of all ballistic missiles, short, medium, long range, and of course those on submarines. That, within the next decade.
"Imagine the scene: you and I, a good decade older, in the year 1996, at this very place, destroying the last nuclear missile in the world. I can imagine both of us getting together again in Iceland to destroy the last Soviet and American missiles under thriumphant circumstances. By then I'll be so old that you won't recognize me. And you will ask in surprise "Hey Ron, is that really you ? What are you doing here ?" and we will destroy the last couple of missile, and have a huge celebration that night over it."

Gorbachev smiled. And the bargaining continued.

"Then, why keep those nuclear bombs on cruise missiles or aircrafts ? Let's get ride of them, too. Hell, let's get ride of all nuclear weapons, as I proposed at the beginning of that year; as a gest of goodwill, I even more the date forward, not in 2001, rather within the next decade, to 1996."

"All nuclear weapons? Well, Mikhail, that's exactly what I've been talking about all along. Get rid of all nuclear weapons. That's always been my goal."

"Then why don't we agree on it?"  

"We should. Yes, we should try to draft some agreement, bring that to Geneva, and see what we can do with that."

Shultz jaw dropped to the floor. The next seconds were the longuest in his life.

A series of events set in motion by a Soviet diplomat's arrest on a New York subway platform and by the reciprocal framing of an American journalist in Moscow had wound up with the two most powerful men in the world agreeing — for the moment, and to the astonishment of their aides — on the abolition of all nuclear weapons within ten years.

Then the talk resumed.

"Now let's talk about that Strategic Defense Initiative of yours." Gorbachev continued.

Shultz sighed.
Reagan had evidently been taken aback.

Back to the reality of the Cold War. Shit, only one minute ago they were talking about erasing nuclear weapons from the face of Earth, and now they will disagree over SDI. The Strategic Defense Initiative that was imagined to break the nuclear deadlock in the first place... What a waste.

Shultz felt as if the summit was already falling appart.

"You know my position, and I know yours." Reagan started in a glacial tone. "You don't ignore that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty forbide deployment but not tests of a space shield. Advanced technologies like laser or particle beam did not existed back in 1972, so in my opinion, the ABM treaty doesn't apply there. In Geneva we disagreed on the very notion of testing. You say the treaty forbidde testing; my own intepretation is that testing is legal. Since tests are allowed, rather than giving up SDI, I instead propose to share the results and technology with you. I already proposed that in Geneva, and I reiterate my proposal. You will be granted access to our laboratories.  Although many people in my country consider me like a fool..."

Gorbachev answer was rather unexpected.

"The Soviet Union don't need to be granted access to your SDI. We don't need to be shown the technology, because we are currently developing it by ourselves. In summary: we have SDI."

"What ?"

Gorbachev repeated. "We have SDI. My military has been developing space-based weapon systems similar to yours - lasers and kinetic killers. You have Brilliant Pebbles, we have Kaskad. You are preparing Zenith Star, we are ahead of you with Polyus."

Reagan was aghast. Shultz just couldn't believe it.

"Then... then why did you oppose the Strategic Defense Initiative so vehemently ?" Reagan was evidently baffled "For eighteen months now, it has been the crux of the deadlock between us - you said give up SDI, I answered I won't, but I will share the technology with you."

Gorbachev smiled.

"Believe or not, I just didn't knew. Our program had started on Andropov days, continued under Chernenko, but all this was half-hearted, and slow-paced, and above all it was entirely hidden from my knowledge. I ran across a piece of our "space shield" while visiting Baikonur for the launch of the civilian space station - the MKBS-1. I learned the thing was to have military applications. I was furious."

A streak of panic ran across Shultz heart. If the Soviets have military hardware aboard their MKBS-1, we are doomed. He tried to assess the consequences. SDI huggers would rightly jump on them, hitting the roof if the talk about erasing the nukes ever leaked to the outside world. You gave the soviets twice an advantage.

But Gorbachev had not finished its revelations, not yet.

"Listen" he continued, well conscious of the nervosity of his interlocutors. "I assured personally that the piece of the MKBS-1 that launched that day was a hundred percent civilian, and only then did I let the launch proceed as planned. Fortunately that Polyus I stumbled across was not to be launched that day, and I can tell you it will never be."

There was a brief moment of silence before Gorbachev resumed the conversation.

"As I said to you, you have the Brilliant Pebbles, we have Kaskad. You are preparing Zenith Star, we are ahead of you with Polyus. Much like nuclear weapons, we reached parity. I'll be a fool to oppose your SDI when  my contry is developping very similar systems ! Neither can I argue over and over about the ABM treaty, for the same reasons. I might instead reconsider your offer of sharing anti ballistic missile technology... on an equal basis, of course."

Reagan breathed in relieve. Shultz, for his part, tried to analyze the last developments.  

...

Now, where do we go from there ?

...

Shultz asked for a brief pause. All the tea they had absorbed that afternoon, plus the stress, had obvious effects on the Soviets, himself, and the President. Gorbachev agreed - saying they were on the brink of a major breakthrough, but both sides needs a little break to absorb the last developments.

Time for a little session of urinal diplomacy Shultz thought. He followed Reagan in the direction of the bathroom - a little ackward maybe, but he had excellent reasons to do so. The President loved to tell a story of how, as president of the Screen Actors Guild in Hollywood, he had paved the way for a deal. The negotiating breakthrough came as Reagan engaged his management counterpart in private discussion while standing next to him at urinals during a recess in the talks.

Well, that was exactly what Shultz intended to do.

"We are on the brink of a major breakthrough." he started "I don't think we should aim too high. Remember our  meeting in Washington on the eve of this ?"

"You mean, when you told me about Fred Iklé bold idea of erasing ballistic missiles ?"

"Spot on. And you do know even that hawkish Weinberger loves the idea."

"Well, George, that idea is very present in my mind this afternoon."

"What do you mean ?"

"It was some minutes before the talk about the elimination of all nuclear weapons. When I told Gorbachev "I can imagine both of us in 10 years getting together again in Iceland to destroy the last Soviet and American missiles under thriumphant circumstances." At that very moment I had Iklé proposal in my mind. It sounded reasonable. Of course that was before Gorbachev talk about eliminating all nuclear weapons."

"I remember that part.  It would make an excellent start."

"But we won't erase all nuclear weapons in this case" Shultz could see that the President was evidently torn.
"No. But if you scrap the missiles, you scrap no less than 80 or even 90% of them."

Reagan face was that of surprise.

"Do we have so much of our nuclear arsenal aboard rockets ? what are B-52s useful for then ?" he laughed.

"Well, the bombers lost the deterrence to missiles early in  the 60's. Today they are merely backups."

"So I should not be mistaken - we should agree on scrapping all ballistic missiles and not all the nukes."

"Indeed. That's a key point."

"Ok, back to the discussions". Regan was determined. "Let's end that meeting on a major breakthrough." He smiled.

***

"Today in Reykjavik we discovered a Soviet leader that share our concerns over nuclear disarmement, the strategic balance, and SDI. That's why together we decided in favour of far-reaching agreement to
a) destroy ballistic missiles as a whole, within the framework of new INF and START treaties,
and
b) share a common knowledge on anti-ballistic missile technology, either kinetic or laser systems, - within the deployement and testing limits sets by  the ABM treaty.
The elimination of ballistic missiles as a whole should cut nuclear arsenals by 80%.  
At a later date the ABM treaty will be amended by the two parties to allow the deployment of a so-called "accidental launch protection system", as an insurance against any rogue state or person threatening the world safety with such weapon.
I, Ronald Reagan, together with M. Gorbachev, urge France, Great Britain and China to join us in our quest of a safer world order."


***

There's so many different worlds
So many different suns
And we have just one world
But we live in different ones...

***

Former Arms Negotiator Says U.S. and Soviets Sincerely Want Non-Nuclear World

Former Sen. John Tower, who recently resigned as an arms control negotiator, said that both the United States and the Soviet Union accept ''the idea of a non-nuclear world,'' but neither has a practical plan to achieve it.
He called for patience and predicted the two nations will come to terms on arms control after long negotiations. Tower was the keynote speaker at a symposium on U.S.-Soviet relations since World War II.
The symposium was proposed by Elspeth Rostow, former dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, who said the meeting was aimed at finding out ''what went right'' in the four decades of peaceful U.S.-Soviet relations. She noted that Tower's career in the Senate covered 1961 to 1985 - much of the 41-year period that is the focus of the conference.
Tower said he was no expert on the Soviet Union, but, ''I have a degree of optimism and hope for the future of U.S.-Soviet relations.
''I believe the most important aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations at this point is the resolution of the arms control issues,'' he said.
''Both nations nearly embraced the idea of a non-nuclear world,'' said Tower. ''But I must say, quite frankly ... I don't think that either nation has a carefully formulated, practical plan to arrive at that result.''
He said talks between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reduced tensions and ''created a somewhat more favorable climate for the arms negotiations in Geneva.''
''We must be patient in the Western democracies. ... We cannot permit our negotiating position to be driven by public diplomacy considerations. It must be driven by security considerations,'' Tower said.
He said he believes the Soviet Union will come to terms with the United States or the two countries will find ''something that's mutually acceptable. There, the elimination of all ballistic missiles, not of all nuclear weapons, might be a more reasonnable objective.
Tower said Gorbachev's economic goals ''are not compatible with the continued dedication of human and material resources to the level of military capability that the Soviet Union now has.''
''And certainly we in the United States would rather dedicate less of our human and material resources and less of the taxpayers' money on weapons.''
He said his year-long experience in Geneva ''has taught me we must not engage simply in strident denunciations of Soviet policy, of Soviet action.''
''We must be firm when we believe the Soviets have breached accepted standards of international behavior,'' he said.

Ça a en effet l'air très intéressant.
Raison de plus pour t'y remettre.

Quelques années plus tard, avec des milices balistiques aux mains de milices comme les Houtis et une bonne dizaine de pays asiatiques en fabricant, les russes et américains laisseraient t'il de côté ces armes ?